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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
MARIE S. McKINNON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20010790-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUTORY CRIMINAL DISCOVERY RULE OF 
SECTION 76-1-303 SHOULD FUNCTION DIFFERENTLY 
FROM CIVIL DISCOVERY RULES BECAUSE, UNLIKE IN 
CIVIL CASES, REASONABLE DELAY IN FILING A 
CRIMINAL INFORMATION IS JUSTIFIABLE 
Defendant argues that cases and statutes controlling the application of discovery 
rules in civil cases should control the interpretation of this criminal statute. Br. of 
Appellee at 9-20. She cites to several civil cases requiring that a discovery rule should 
not extend a statute of limitations if a plaintiff discovered their action before the 
expiration of the original limitations period. See, e.g., O 'Neal v. Division of Family 
Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991); Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282, 1285 
(Utah 1998); Br. of Appellee at 17-20. These civil cases should not control the 
interpretation of this criminal statute, however, because they fail to recognize that delay in 
the filing of a criminal information may be justified although delay in filing a civil 
complaint may not. Thus, the criminal discovery rule should function differently from 
civil discovery rules. 
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme court have held that a civil plaintiff who 
discovers his cause of action prior to the expiration of the original limitations period may 
not avoid the statute of limitations. See O 'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1144; Horn v. Utah Dept. of 
Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 101-02 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Such delay in civil cases only 
serves to prejudice defendants by allowing plaintiffs to litigate potentially stale claims. 
See Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981); O'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1145. 
Conversely, the United States Supreme Court has held that reasonable delay in 
filing criminal charges is not always so one-sided. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 
783, 795 (1977) (comparing a prosecutor's "investigative delay" with delay taken "solely 
'to gain tactical advantage over the accused'") (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 
370, 324 (1971)). After a prosecutor discovers a crime, he may delay filing criminal 
charges until he has had a reasonable time to consider several important factors. See id. at 
791-96. Such delay is justified, because a prosecutor's careful consideration of theses 
factors before filing charges benefits defendants, courts, and society. Id. 
For example, after a prosecutor discovers a crime, but before he files charges, he 
should consider whether he has sufficient evidence to prove a suspect's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. at 791. Failure to do so could negatively affect his case because the 
filing of premature charges "could make obtaining proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
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doubt impossible by causing potentially fruitful sources of information to evaporate 
before they are fully exploited." Id. at 791-92. More importantly, however, the filing of 
premature charges also harms defendants "because it would increase the likelihood of 
unwarranted charges being filed, and would add to the time during which defendants 
stand accused but untried." Id. at 791. Formal accusations significantly interfere with a 
defendant's liberty. Id. The filing of premature charges could also harm the courts 
"because it would cause scarce resources to be consumed on cases that prove to be 
insubstantial, or that involve only some of the responsible parties or some of the criminal 
acts." Id. at 792. As the United States Supreme Court concluded, "no one's interests 
would be well served by compelling prosecutors to initiate prosecutions as soon as they 
are legally entitled to do so." Id. 
Moreover, the determination of whether the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt 
is a difficult determination. As the United States Supreme Court observed, "[t]he 
determination of when the evidence available to the prosecution is sufficient to obtain a 
conviction is seldom clear-cut, and reasonable persons will often reach conflicting 
conclusions." Id. at 793. Thus, forcing a prosecutor to file charges hastily or risk running 
of the statute of limitations would "pressure prosecutors into resolving doubtful cases in 
favor of early and possibly unwarranted prosecutions." Id. 
The sufficiency of the evidence to prove guilt is not the only factor that a 
prosecutor must consider when deciding whether to file charges. When multiple 
defendants commit a crime, and a prosecutor has sufficient evidence with respect to only 
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one defendant, a prosecutor must also consider whether the filing of a charge against the 
one defendant "would impair the prosecutor's ability to continue his investigation, 
thereby preventing society from bringing lawbreakers to justice." Id. at 793. Even if the 
prosecutor's investigation of the remaining defendant's would not be hampered by filing 
charges against a single defendant, "the necessary result would be multiple trials 
involving a single set of facts." Id. This would "place needless burdens on defendants, 
law enforcement officials, and courts." Id. 
Finally, a prosecutor must also have a reasonable time after discovery of a crime to 
consider whether the filing of criminal charges is even appropriate. Id. at 794. A 
decision to file criminal charges produces profound consequences and "requires 
consideration of a wide range of factors in addition to the strength of the Government's 
case, in order to determine whether prosecution would be in the public interest." Id. 
Thus, contrary to defendant's assertion, the decision of whether to file criminal charges 
cannot usually be made in an hour, especially in fraud-based cases. See Br. of Appellee at 
22-23. 
A prosecutor must have sufficient time after discovery of an offense to evaluate 
the above factors. When a prosecutor carefully does so, he benefits not only his case, but 
also defendants, the courts, and society. Id. at 791-96. As the United States Supreme 
Court held, a prosecutor abides by the "standards of 'fair play and decency'" when "he 
refuses to seek indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should prosecute and 
will be able promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Smith v. 
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United States, 360 U.S. 1,10 (1959)). Forcing a prosecutor to file charges hastily or risk 
running of the statute of limitations, however, prevents a prosecutor from fully 
considering the above factors and serves no one's interests. Thus, while such a delay in a 
civil case may only prejudice a defendant, extending the criminal statute of limitations, 
even when the crime was discovered prior to the expiration of the statute, benefits 
defendants. Accordingly, the statutory criminal discovery rule of section 76-1-303 should 
not function in the same way as the civil discovery rules. 
II. SECTION 76-1-303 JUSTIFIABLY EXTENDS THE 
CRIMINAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHILE ALSO 
PREVENTING THE LITIGATION OF STALE CLAIMS 
Section 76-1-303 justifiably extends the criminal statute of limitations for fraud-
based crimes, even when the crime is discovered before the expiration of the original 
limitations period. The statute recognizes that, unlike most crimes, those involving fraud 
are not always easily discoverable. It also recognizes that when a fraud-based crime is 
not discovered until shortly before the expiration of the limitations period, a prosecutor 
may not have sufficient time to consider the important factors discussed above. Thus, 
section 76-1-303 allows a prosecutor a reasonable time—one year—within which to file a 
fraud-based charge, regardless of whether the crime was discovered before or after the 
expiration of the original limitations period. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303(1) (1999). 
Section 76-1-303 also prevents the prosecution of stale charges. A defendant is 
never required to defend against a fraud-based charge filed more than three years after the 
original limitations period would have expired. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303(2) 
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(1999). Furthermore, if the original limitations period expires before charges are filed, 
the State must file charges within one year of the discovery of the fraud-based offense. § 
76-1-303(1) (1999). Accordingly, although section 76-1-303 justifiably extends the 
original statute of limitations, it nevertheless bars the prosecution of stale claims by 
allowing a maximum of only three additional years in which to prosecute fraud-based 
claims, regardless of when the crimes are discovered. 
Moreover, defendant cannot seriously complain that she is being forced to defend 
against a stale charge. The information was filed 16 April 2001, only seventeen days 
after expiration of the original two-year limitations period. R. 1-2. The last possible day 
the information could have been filed was 30 June 2001, which was only three months 
after the expiration of the original limitations period. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-
303(1) (1999) (providing that the information must be filed within one year after 
discovery). Thus, under the statute, the latest the State could have filed the information 
was only two years and three months after the crime was committed. It is unlikely that a 
charge becomes stale in seventeen days, or even three months. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should dismiss the trial court's order of 
dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings. 
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